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ABSTRACT
Online portals include an increasing amount of user feedback in
form of ratings and reviews. Recent research highlighted the im-
portance of this feedback and confirmed that positive feedback
improves product sales figures and thus its success. However, on-
line portals’ operators act as central authorities throughout the
overall review process. In the worst case, operators can exclude
users from submitting reviews, modify existing reviews, and intro-
duce fake reviews by fictional consumers. This paper presents Re-
viewChain, a decentralized review approach. Our approach avoids
central authorities by using blockchain technologies, decentralized
apps and storage. Thereby, we enable users to submit and retrieve
untampered reviews. We highlight the implementation challenges
encountered when realizing our approach on the public Ethereum
blockchain. For each implementation challange, we discuss possible
design alternatives and their trade-offs regarding costs, security,
and trustworthiness. Finally, we analyze which design decision
should be chosen to support specific trade-offs and present result-
ing combinations of decentralized blockchain technologies, also
with conventional centralized technologies.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering→ Software design engineer-
ing; Software design tradeoffs; • Networks→ Network protocols;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online portals often allow consumers to rate products on a five-star
scale and by writing a review message. Ratings and reviews are
used for various purposes, e.g., for products bought on Amazon1,
trips booked on Tripadvisor2, or apps downloaded from the Apple
App Store3. These portals receive an increasing amount of user
feedback, e.g., Tripadvsior claims to serve more than 500 million
traveler-generated reviews. Consumers use this feature to express
their satisfaction and experiences with products. A large body of re-
search analyzes reviews, for example to summarize them [7] and to
understand their helpfulness [9]. When deciding between products,
reviews have a considerable impact on consumers’ choice [3, 5].
Research found that ratings and review correlate with sales and
download ranks [6, 11]. Stable and numerous ratings are associated
with high quality and lead to higher downloads and sales numbers.
Consumers that rely on reviews when deciding for a product,
have to trust at least two parties involved. These are the review
1https://www.amazon.com
2https://www.tripadvisor.com
3https://itunes.apple.com/us/genre/ios/id36?mt=8
authors and the operators of online portals. Untrustworthy reviews
of single authors, e.g., an extremely positive review in between
negative reviews, can possibly be recognized by consumers. How-
ever, this does not apply for larger amounts of reviews modified by
online portal operators themselves. The operators act as central au-
thorities throughout the complete review process. In worst case, an
operator can exclude consumers from submitting reviews, modify
existing reviews, and introduce fake reviews to improve the ratings
and rankings of products [4, 8, 10].
In this paper, we aim to resolve the problem of central author-
ities, being able to influence the review processes, by using the
public Ethereum blockchain. Consumers no longer need to rely
on central authorities as blockchains operate decentrally across a
network of several nodes, in which every user can participate [1].
Thereby, we enable consumers to submit and access untampered
and trustworthy reviews. The contribution of the paper is twofold:
(1) We propose a decentralized review approach which does not
involve central authorities.
(2) We summarize the approach’s major implementation chal-
lenges on the public Ethereum blockchain, discuss design
alternatives, and compare their trade-offs.
The remainder of the papers is structured as follows: Section 2
introduces the most important terminologies used in this paper.
Section 3 describes our ReviewChain approach and its design
goals. Section 4 discusses the major challenges encountered when
implementing the approach on the Ethereum blockchain. Finally,
Section 5 analyzes configurations of design alternatives with regard
to their resulting trade-offs.
2 TERMINOLOGY
Ethereum4 is a blockchain, developed in 2014 by Vitalik Buterin. In
comparison to the Bitcoin blockchain, which only handles accounts
and transactions, Ethereum also stores programming logic. When
paying for its execution, any turing-complete script can be run
on Ethereum. Thereby, it enables decentralized apps without any
possibility of downtime, censorship, or third-party interference.
Transactions are digitally signed messages that are persisted on
the blockchain. Each transaction is associated with an action, such
as transferring cryptocurrency units. Transactions have a sender
and receiver address. The addresses represent a public key belong-
ing to a specific user.
Ether (ETH) is the cryptocurrency traded on the Ethereum block-
chain. It is used to pay nodes of the network for executing requested
operations, such as transactions.
Smart Contracts were first introduced by Szabo [12] in 1994.
These are self-executing and operate autonomously. In Ethereum,
4https://www.ethereum.org
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Figure 1: Centralized and ReviewChain Approach.
smart contracts can be written by, e.g., using the Solidity program-
ming language [14]. Contracts are executed on several nodes of the
network within Ethereum virtual machines (EVM). After executing
a contract, nodes must reach a consensus of the calculated result.
3 REVIEWCHAIN APPROACH
ReviewChain focuses on creating and providing persistent access
to untampered product ratings and reviews. Its fundamental goal is
to avoid central authorities. Therefore, our approach utilizes tech-
nologies, such as the blockchain as decentralized and immutable
data storage, and decentralized apps to provide access to reviews.
A comparison of the conventional centralized review approach
and our decrentralized ReviewChain approach is shown in Fig-
ure 1. In the upper part of the figure, central authorities are able to
exclude specific consumers from submitting reviews. Further, au-
thorities store reviews in a centralized database. This enables them
to modify exisiting reviews and introduce fake reviews by fictional
consumers that did not buy the reviewed product. In the decren-
tralized approach, shown in the bottom part of the figure, this is
no longer possible. Once stored on the blockchain, reviews cannot
be modified, neither can consumers be excluded from providing
reviews. We refer to these reviews as untampered reviews.
OurReviewChain approachmust fulfill four requirements. These
are extracted from existing review functionalities used for product
reviews on Amazon or app reviews within the Apple App Store:
(1) Authors must have purchased the reviewed product,
(2) Review authors must be distinguishable,
(3) Each author can only submit one review per product version,
(4) Review submissions must not result in any costs for authors.
In the following, we apply our approach to the real-world sce-
nario of mobile app reviews. Therefore, we enable authors to submit
reviews within native apps, and provide access to reviews via a
web service. By doing so, we aim to highlight additional challanges
which result from the usage of different technological environments.
Moreover, we implement our approach on Ethereum to demonstrate
the applicability and limitations of a blockchain technologies.
4 IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
This section describes the major implementation challenges of our
approach. The challenges are divided into sections. Each section
describes possible design alternatives and discusses their trade-offs.
4.1 Submitting Transactions via Mobile Apps
After publishing a smart contract on the blockchain, which allows
consumers to store reviews, the contract is executed by sending a
transaction to the contract address. Each transaction needs to be
signed with the user’s private key. Figure 2 shows two alternatives
to submit transactions via mobile apps.
The first alternative implements the transaction handling within
a backend. App and backend communicate using a REST API. The
transactions, as well as the private keys, are generated by the back-
end. The keys are storedwithin a centralized database. After signing,
the transactions are sent to an Ethereum node. This node can be
run by the backend itself. In the second alternative, the creation of
transactions and private keys are contained within the app itself.
Signed transactions are directly sent to an Ethereum node.
Comparing both, the first alternative offers several advantages.
Computation-intensive operations, such as generating and de-/en-
crypting private keys can be performed on backend-side instead
of using a resource-limited mobile device. Also, as fees have to be
paid to execute transactions and our approach requires reviewers
not to pay for these, the central database of the backend can be
used to create a list of all participating users’ addresses. These can
be funded beforehand with tokens to pay the transaction fees of
review submissions. However, this alternative introduces a major
drawback, the backend acts as a central authority. By not authenti-
cating users, operators can exclude those from submitting reviews.
Also, the stored private keys can be used to submit reviews without
users’ behalf. As a result, a decentralized design, as presented in the
second alternative, is preferable. In this design, the mobile app must
self-contain the private key, as well as the transaction handling.
To realize the second alternative, an official implementation of
the Ethereum protocol, called Go Ethereum (Geth)5, exists. The
implementation can be cross-compiled to both Android and iOS.
Using Java and Swift wrappers, it can be directly called from within
the app’s native implementation. In addition, Geth generates native
5https://geth.ethereum.org
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wrappers for smart contracts. Geth offers account management,
remote node interfacing, and enables interactions with smart con-
tracts. For example, private keys are generated and stored in an
encrypted keystore. This keystore offers a standard and light secu-
rity mode. However, due to the mobile device’s resource limitations,
the author suggest to use only the light security mode [13]. Al-
though decentralized, this introduces a security risk. The keys are
stored in the app’s document directory. On regular devices, both
Android and iOS, this folder can only be accessed by the applica-
tion itself. On jailbroken devices apps can access all files on the
mobile device. Thereby, the user’s private keys can be transmitted
to an external server. A server’s high computational capacities can
be used to brute-force the private key’s passphrase and perform
transactions afterwards, without the behalf of the user.
4.2 Restricting Access to App Users
After a user submits a review, the transaction including the review
is created, signed, and sent to an Ethereum node. When the nodes
of the network reached consensus, the transaction is immutably
persisted on the blockchain. Since each person can participate in
the network, by downloading a copy of the blockchain and running
a node, transactions, as well as smart contracts, are publicly visible.
This enables participants of the network to copy, modify (e.g., by
changing the review text), and resubmit transactions. The partici-
pants must not necessarily have downloaded the app the review
targets. Thereby, fake reviews can be introduced to the blockchain.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to solve this issue without using a
central authority. In the following, we describe three alternatives to
exclude non-app users from submitting reviews to the blockchain:
First, the smart contract can specify a white-list of addresses al-
lowed to interact with it. Therefore, for each transaction targeting
the contract its sender address (msg.sender) is compared with the
list. Since all addresses (i.e., app users) are unknown beforehand, the
contract must implement a method to register additional addresses.
As a drawback, this method can be used to register addresses that
did not download the app. Second, an ERC-20 token6 can be issued
and distributed to app users. The smart contract methods must
require the sender address to own a token before execution. Fur-
ther, the contract must ensure that these tokens are untradeable
between users. This alternative also requires tokens to be trans-
ferred to reviewers by a central authority. Third, a private key to
sign transactions can be bundled with the app. By solely white-
listening this key’s address in the smart contract, only app users are
authorized to submit reviews. To use this key, its passphrase must
be included in the app as well. This introduces a security risk, since
key and passphrase can be extracted so that fake reviews can be
created from outside of the app. Additionally, since all users use the
same key, we are unable to distinguish them. As a consequence, we
cannot ensure that each user only submits one review per product
version.
4.3 Reducing Costs of Data Storage
Another challenge is the storage of review data and its associated
costs. The Ethereum yellow paper [14] states that a fee of 20,000 gas
is required to store a 256-bit word on the blockchain, i.e., 625 gas
6https://www.ethereum.org/token
per byte. Gas is a unit to measure the computational effort required
to perform an action within the Ethereum network. The cost of
a transaction, e.g., storing data on the blockchain, is calculate by
multiplying the amount of gas with the gas price. The gas price is
measured in Gwei, where 1 ETH equals 1 billion Gwei. The price is
decided by the miners, who perform the transactions, based on the
network conditions. If transactions specify a too low gas price, these
will not be processed by miners. Vice versa, the higher the price,
the faster transactions will be processed. At the time of writing,
in February 2018, the gas price to process a transaction below 5
minutes is 5 Gwei, while the median price of the last 1,500 blocks
is 22 Gwei. The value of one ETH is $885.
A single 7-day Spotify release for iOS, for example, contains 3,025
reviews with an overall size of 270,110 bytes. To store this amount
of data, an amount of 168,818,750 gas is required. Considering a gas
price of 5 Gwei the storage costs are 0.844 ETH or $747. This equals
$0.247 per review. Using 22 Gwei, the costs are $3,287 or $1.09 per
review. The costs can be reduced by defining a low gas price, which
consequently requires more time for reviews to be processed.
In the following, we discuss three solutions to reduce storage
costs: First, compression algorithms can be used. Alakuijala et al. [2]
introduce Brotli, a compression algorithm including a static dictio-
nary and thereby appropriate for short texts. Second, instead of the
complete review only its hash can be persisted on the blockchain.
The hash length is independent of the review. This reduces costs of
longer reviews. The actual review can be stored on a central server.
When accessing reviews, their hashes are compared to those on the
blockchain. However, this design introduces a single point of failure.
Third, a better alternative is to use a a peer-to-peer distributed file
system, such as Swarm7 or InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)8, see
Figure 3. These seek to connect all computing devices with the
same system of files. IPFS, for example, provides an immutable,
content-addressed block storage model. Each item can be identified
by a hash and accessed using an URL. By using a distributed file
system, the single authority and point of failure is removed.
4.4 Third-Party Transaction Fee Payments
When performing a transaction, the sender must pay its fee, i.e., in
our case the reviewer. As our approch requires that submissions
are free of costs for reviewers, we present and discuss three design
alternatives in the following:
7https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/tree/swarm
8https://ipfs.io
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Table 1: Optimized Trade-Offs and their resulting Configurations of Design Alternatives (A1 refers to Alternative 1).
Trade-Offs Design Alternatives Optimi-
Security Trust Costs Section 4.1: Submission 4.2: Authorization 4.3: Data Storage 4.4: Transact. Fees 4.5: Retrieval zed for
Good Medium Medium A2: Via App (Directly) A2: ERC-20 Token A3: Decentralized A3: Smart Contract A2: Local Security
Poor Good Medium A2: Via App (Directly) A3: Pool Key (App) A3: Decentralized A3: Smart Contract A2: Local Trust
Good Poor Good A2: Via App (Directly) A2: ERC-20 Token A2: Centralized A3: Smart Contract A2: Local Costs
First, as we decided against using a centralized backend to store
users’ private keys, we do not know their addresses. To collect
these, a website can be deployed for users to (automatically) pub-
lish their addresses. Afterwards, the addresses can be funded with
ETH. However, this website can be used without submitting a re-
view afterwards. Second, free-of-charge transactions with a gas
price set to zero can be used. These transactions are very unlikely
to be picked by miners. Therefore, a central authority has to mine
all transactions going to the contract’s address. As a drawback, the
authority could decide against processing single transactions to,
e.g., exclude users writing negative reviews. Also, the time to pro-
cess a review highly depends on the mining capacity of the central
authority. Third, to avoid a central authority a smart contract can
be used to reward miners. A miner that processed a transaction
pointing to the address of the contract has to prove that the gas
price was zero. The smart contract can then refund the miner for
processing the transaction. The reward is paid from a pool address
into which product vendors deposit tokens. It should equal the me-
dian transaction fees, normally paid by transaction senders, so that
these are as likely to be picked by miners as regular transactions.
4.5 Retrieval of Untampered Reviews
Our aim is to enable users to access reviews on the blockchain in
a usable and untampered manner. Therefore, we deploy a decen-
tralized app (dApp). This app must fulfill several requirements: It
must be completely open source, operate autonomously, and data
must be decentrally stored to avoid central points of failure. Further,
dApps must use tokens for access and to rewards miners, e.g., Gas.
From an implementational perspective, the dApp consists of
a frontend and backend. The frontend can be developed in any
language, such as JavaScript. To fulfill the above mentioned require-
ments, it is deployed on a decentralized storage such as Swarm or
IFPS. The backend is implemented as a smart contract and deployed
on the Ethereum blockchain. The dApp connects to an Ethereum
node using an remote procedure call (RPC) connection. As the re-
views are timely distributed, the node has to have a full replica
of the blockchain. In case a remote node is used, the user has to
trust that it returns unmodified results. To ensure that the dApp
reads untampered data from the blockchain, the user has to start a
node by herself. As a drawback, a large amount of data has to be
downloaded, which requires space and time, and is unappropriate
for mobile devices.
5 DISCUSSION
Table 1 list three possible configurations of design alternatives (one
per row). Each configuration combines different design alternatives
with regard to their trade-offs. The first alternative is optimized for
high security. It submits transactions directly from within the app,
uses an ERC-20 token to authorize consumers to submit reviews,
and stores data decentrally (e.g., using IFPS or Swarm). Further, it
uses smart contracts to reward miners processing the review trans-
actions. For retrieval of reviews it uses a decentralized app accessing
a local Ethereum node. For the second alternative trustworthiness
is optimized. In comparison to the first, it bundles the app with a
private pool key to sign transactions, and thereby completely avoids
central authorities. As a drawback, this design reduces the imple-
mentation’s security as the private key and its passphrase can be
extracted from the app. The last alternative focuses on optimizing
costs. Except for using a centralized database to store the complete
reviews (not hashes), it equals the first approach. Thereby it reduces
storage costs, with the drawback of reducing the trustworthiness of
reviews, as the database contents can be modified by its operator.
We conclude by highlighting, that depending on the trade-offs
to be achieved, such as optimizing for security, trustworthiness,
or costs, different configurations of design alternatives need to be
chosen. This can either be a completely decentralized approach,
based on blockchain technologies, or a combination of decentralized
and centralized design alternatives, such as a blockchain to store
reviews hashes and a conventional database to store its contents.
REFERENCES
[1] Cuneyt Gurcan Akcora, Yulia R Gel, and Murat Kantarcioglu. 2017. Blockchain -
A Graph Primer. CoRR (2017).
[2] Jyrki Alakuijala, Evgenii Kliuchnikov, Zoltan Szabadka, and Lode Vandevenne.
2015. Comparison of brotli, deflate, zopfli, lzma, lzham and bzip2 compression
algorithms. Google Inc. (2015).
[3] Patrali Chatterjee. 2001. Online reviews: do consumers use them?. In Association
for Consumer Research 2001 Proceedings. 129–134.
[4] Tommaso Fornaciari and Massimo Poesio. 2014. Identifying fake Amazon reviews
as learning from crowds. EACL.
[5] Ulrike Gretzel and Kyung Hyan Yoo. 2008. Use and Impact of Online Travel
Reviews. (2008), 35–46. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-77280-5_4
[6] M Harman, Yue Jia, and Yuanyuan Zhang. 2012. App store mining and analysis:
MSR for app stores. In 2012 9th IEEE Working Conference on Mining Software
Repositories (MSR 2012). IEEE, 108–111. https://doi.org/10.1109/MSR.2012.6224306
[7] Minqing Hu and Bing Liu. 2004. Mining and summarizing customer reviews. In
the 2004 ACM SIGKDD international conference. ACM Press, New York, New York,
USA, 168–177. https://doi.org/10.1145/1014052.1014073
[8] Nitin Jindal and Bing Liu. 2008. Opinion spam and analysis. In the international
conference. ACM Press, New York, New York, USA, 219–230. https://doi.org/10.
1145/1341531.1341560
[9] SusanMMudambi and David Schuff. 2010. What Makes a Helpful Online Review?
A Study of Customer Reviews on Amazon.com. MIS Quarterly (2010).
[10] Arjun Mukherjee, Vivek Venkataraman, Bing Liu 0001, and Natalie S Glance.
2013. What Yelp Fake Review Filter Might Be Doing? ICWSM .
[11] Dennis Pagano and Walid Maalej. 2013. User feedback in the appstore - An
empirical study. RE, 125–134. https://doi.org/10.1109/RE.2013.6636712
[12] Nick Szabo. 1994. Smart contracts. (1994). http://szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.
contracts.html
[13] Peter Szilagy. 2017. Go Ethereum: Mobile account management. (2017). https:
//github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/wiki/Mobile:-Account-management
[14] Gavin Wood. 2014. Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction
ledger. Ethereum Project Yellow Paper 151. (2014).
4
